I agree with Tyler's interpretation and also agree that the current version
of the statute leaves this unclear. When I give students duration problems
to solve, I include one that fits this situation, i.e., one that would have
expired before 1998 but after 1977. The problem always leads to student
recognition that something is missing from the statute, much to their
consternation and confusion.
At 08:14 AM 1/14/03 -0500, you wrote:
>At 11:16 AM 1/13/03 -0800, Tyler Ochoa wrote:
>>The version of 304(b) that was in
>>effect from 1/1/78 to 10/27/98 extended those copyrights to 75 years
>>from first publication; and the current version of 304(b) [effective
>>10/27/98] extended those copyrights which were still subsisting to 95
>>years from the date of first publication.
>
>That is plainly the only way to justify the result, and probably will work
>well enough in practice (if we can ennoble the SB Act with words like
>"work" and "well"). My puzzlement arose from the odd mechanism by which
>this is achieved. Normally, in the case of complex phasing-in or
>superseding legislation (tax laws jump readily to mind), the transitional
>provisions are preserved in the later statute. Thus, if 304(b) had
>retained the '76 Act language and clearly made it applicable to the
>1978-98 period, then the current 304(b) wording would have context and
>make sense (so to speak). As it is, one has to make the interpretive leap
>of faith that something that is not law now can yet still be law now for
>purposes of filling holes in the current statute.
>
>
>Vance R. Koven, Senior Attorney
>Comverse, Inc.
>100 Quannapowitt Parkway
>Wakefield, MA 01880 USA
>+1 781-224-8523 (vox humana)
>+1 781-224-8144 (fax mechanica)
Amy Cohen
Professor of Law
Western New England College
Springfield, MA 01119
413-782-1430
acohen[_at_]law.wnec.edu
Received on Thu Jan 16 2003 - 21:12:53 GMT
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.2.0 : Mon Mar 26 2007 - 00:35:47 GMT