Re: Leaning the other way in Princeton v. MDS

At 8:48 AM 3/7/96 -0500, Jonathan Franklin wrote:
>
> Section 107(1) says "whether such *use* is of a commercial
> nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;" regardless of who
> does the copying, the use is for non-profit eductaional purposes. The
> statute should not be interpreted to concatenate the concepts of "to
> use" and "to copy" because the test would then hinge on the party
> pushing the button instead of the party who will be *using* the
> materials. How about a nonprofit job training cooperative-run copyshop
> duplicating works for IBM?

This is sophistry. (Not that there's anything wrong with sophistry -- some of my best friends are sophists). Yeah, it says "use," but the question is who's "using" it and for what. If the copyshop is "using" an original work to make a profit by selling it to students, then there's nothing educational about their "use." Maybe the test shouldn't turn on whose "pushing the button," but it sure shouldn't turn on who's buying and reading the pirated copy and why.

> Imagine what this interpretation would do to 107(4). Factor 4
> would read "the effect of the *copying* upon the potential market . . ."
> In a case like MDS where distribution was limited to class members, this
> reinterpretation would fundamentally alter the meaning of 107. This is
> a case for adopting the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation.
> "To use" should not be interpreted as equivalent to "to copy" in the
> context of 107.

Imagine what your interpretation would do for copyright protection for textbooks. No matter who copied, no matter how much was copied, the eventual "use" is educational and therefore, I gather, a "fair use."

J. Noble
<jnoble[_at_]dgs.dgsys.com> Received on Sun Mar 10 1996 - 04:43:00 GMT