On 4/1/97, Tyler T. Ochoa <tochoa[_at_]law.whittier.edu> wrote:
>
> There is legislative history suggesting that derivative works do
> not have to be fixed to be infringing, but I think that, in context,
> that history should be read as limited to uses that would violate one
> of the other exclusive rights: i.e., public display, or public
> performance (neither of which requires a fixation beyond the original
> work).
I'm curious as to your rationale for the limiting interpretation. Why shouldn't an unfixed derivative work (like a privately performed jazz improvisation) be actionable as an infringing derivative work without regard to whether another right in the copyright bundle is also implicated?
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