On 8/19/98, Daniel J. Schaeffer <daniel_schaeffer[_at_]kirkland.com> wrote:
>
> I think you're taking an over-literal approach to the question of
> shared use of land. While it is true that no two physical objects
> can occupy the exact same spot of physical space at the exact same
> time, it is also true that land can be shared.
And the more it is shared, the more congested it becomes. Or, as Woody Allen put it, space is nature's way of keeping everything from happening to you at once.
This is not true of copyrightable works -- they never become congested. They are not private goods.
> The copyright analogy to your "physical impossibility" argument
> seems to be the simultaneous reading of the same word in the same
> text by two different people -- which is, unlike the land analog,
> possible.
Exactly my point. In fact, we can cheaply and easily arrange for thousands or millions of people to simultaneously read the same word in the same text. We cannot do this for land; it is not reproducible.
> However, I'm not convinced that's the relevant level of granularity
> we should be looking at, and it's clearly not what Mr. Henderson is
> talking about.
Heaven only knows what Mr. Henderson is talking about. He seems to think that both land and ideal goods have infinite carrying capacity. This is clearly not true in the case of land.
> Why is your analogy the appropriate approach to take and not his?
I don't believe I made any analogy. I simply pointed out an obvious characteristic of physical goods, which differentiates them from ideal goods, and which demonstrates that his analogy to land is inapposite.
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