On 19 Aug 1998, Dan L. Burk <burkdanl[_at_]shu.edu> wrote:
>
> On 8/19/98, Daniel J. Schaeffer <daniel_schaeffer[_at_]kirkland.com> wrote:
> >
> > The copyright analogy to your "physical impossibility" argument
> > seems to be the simultaneous reading of the same word in the same
> > text by two different people -- which is, unlike the land analog,
> > possible.
>
> Exactly my point. In fact, we can cheaply and easily arrange for
> thousands or millions of people to simultaneously read the same word
> in the same text. We cannot do this for land; it is not
> reproducible.
>
> > However, I'm not convinced that's the relevant level of granularity
> > we should be looking at, and it's clearly not what Mr. Henderson is
> > talking about.
>
> Heaven only knows what Mr. Henderson is talking about. He seems to
> think that both land and ideal goods have infinite carrying capacity.
> This is clearly not true in the case of land.
Talking about property I am talking about ownership -- not use, possession, manufacture, etc. Ownership. Under copyright, ownership is first and dictates use, possession, and making copies when making copies is possible.
I wish my ownership of intellectual property to be protected and respected as much as any other form of ownership.
> > Why is your analogy the appropriate approach to take and not his?
>
> I don't believe I made any analogy. I simply pointed out an obvious
> characteristic of physical goods, which differentiates them from
> ideal goods, and which demonstrates that his analogy to land is
> inapposite.
Theories like this are made up after the fact. To that extent they are nonesense. Legislation responds to political situations and pressures, not to such theories.
I dare say if someone produced a machine that could copy industrial products as well as electronic copiers reproduce paper, audio, software, and video creations, we would be singing some different tunes.
Albert Henderson, Editor, PUBLISHING RESEARCH QUARTERLY 70244.1532[_at_]compuserve.com Received on Tue Aug 25 1998 - 22:01:43 GMT
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